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A R T I C L E  I N F O   
Handling editor - J.E. Fernández  
Keywords: 
Water allocation regime 
Security-differentiated water rights 
Drought management 
Positive Mathematical Programming 
Spain 
A B S T R A C T   
This paper examines the effectiveness of reforming water rights regimes in the agricultural sector by replacing 
allocation procedures based on the proportional rule with the implementation of a priority rule that establishes 
security-differentiated water rights. The main objective is to assess whether this change improves the economic 
efficiency of water allocation at the irrigation district level, particularly during cyclical scarcity events. To this 
end, a Positive Mathematical Programming model is built to simulate the performance of the proposed reform in 
an irrigation district in southern Spain. The results show that the efficiency gains brought about by this change 
are very small, which casts doubt on its ability to improve water-use efficiency in the agricultural sector at the 
local level (i.e., irrigation district) under current local climate and water availability conditions. In any case, 
further research is needed to assess the suitability of this change in allocations rules at basin scale with greater 
farm heterogeneity, especially given the likelihood of more frequent, more intense droughts due to climate 
change.   
1. Introduction and objectives 
Water resources provide important ecosystem and socio-cultural 
services (e.g., biodiversity, pollution sinks, or recreational facilities), 
and share many characteristics with public goods. In addition, water 
resources are a commodity used as an input in many economic activities 
(e.g., agriculture, industry, or energy production). Furthermore, access 
to supply facilities (drinking water and sanitation) is a basic human right 
that contributes to the maintenance of public health. All this makes 
water a complex economic good (Hanemann, 2006). For this reason, 
water generally enjoys a special legal status, managed according to the 
‘public trust’ doctrine, which aims to ensure efficiency, equity, and 
environmental sustainability (Rogers et al., 2002). According to this 
doctrine, water management is usually based on centralized allocation 
regimes involving water rights (also called entitlements, licenses, con-
cessions, or permits) granted by a public authority that determines how 
much water can be diverted from water bodies and who is allowed to use 
these resources (rights holders only). 
The current allocation regimes are determined by historical water 
availability and traditional usage patterns, which generally do not 
correspond to current social preferences. In fact, most of them are not 
designed to adapt to changing conditions affecting both the demand (e. 
g., growing demand for water for economic activities and the environ-
ment) and the supply (e.g., climate change) of water resources. These 
outdated designs lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of water, such as 
the use of this resource as an input for crops with low water productivity, 
or the over-abstraction of water bodies, which jeopardizes water supply 
reliability and the provision of ecosystem services (OECD, 2015). In 
order to solve these inefficiencies in water allocation, many countries 
have developed water trading instruments (water markets and water 
banks) to make allocation regimes more flexible and allow them to be 
adapted to new circumstances (Bjornlund, 2003a; Debaere et al., 2014; 
Howitt, 2015). Along the same lines, there have been calls for a reform 
of these allocation regimes, aimed at achieving a more efficient and 
sustainable allocation of increasingly scarce water resources (e.g., Bruns 
et al., 2005; Hodgson, 2006). 
It is worth pointing out that the availability of water varies over time 
and space, which makes the temporal and spatial matching of supply 
and demand a major challenge for water managers (Hanemann, 2006). 
This variability means water scarcity is dynamic, ranging from wet pe-
riods, when all volumes granted by water rights can be fully provided, to 
dry periods (droughts), when scarce water resources have to be rationed. 
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Although storage (e.g., reservoirs) and conveyance (e.g., channels and 
pipelines) infrastructure is used to minimize this mismatch, significant 
fluctuations in resource availability inherent in any water system as a 
consequence of the natural water cycle (seasonal and interannual vari-
ability of rainfall and water flows) mean that water supply cannot be 
fully guaranteed, especially in more arid regions. Moreover, the fre-
quency and intensity of these episodes of cyclical scarcity (droughts) are 
exacerbated in many regions by climate change, resulting in water 
supply becoming less and less reliable (Bisselink et al., 2018). When a 
drought episode occurs, allocation regimes also determine how the 
available scarce resources are to be shared among the water rights 
holders by determining the proportion of the volumes granted by these 
rights that each holder can actually use. 
This paper focuses on the allocation regimes implemented within the 
agricultural sector, the world’s largest water user, and more specifically 
on the rationing systems to be applied to irrigation water rights holders 
during cyclical scarcity events (droughts). In this sense, there are two 
main alternative approaches to rationing irrigation water allocations: 
those based on the proportional rule and those based on priority rules 
(OECD, 2016). The proportional rule is the most widely-used rationing 
method for irrigation water allocation during hydrological droughts. 
According to this rule, all water rights holders receive a quantity of 
water proportional to their water rights, so that total demand equals 
total supply. For the implementation of the priority rule, the irrigation 
rights holders are divided into priority classes, with their water rights 
being allocated lexicographically according to the established priority 
levels. This means that the demands of the rights holders with the 
highest priority are met first, and only when they are fully met is the 
remaining resource allocated to the following rights holders according 
to a criterion of decreasing priority order (Gómez-Limón et al., 2020). 
Both allocation rules have their pros and cons. The proportional rule 
is easy to understand by rights holders and easy to implement in a real- 
world setting. Moreover, it is generally judged to be a ‘fair’ procedure for 
rationing water since it promotes equal shares allocated to equal de-
mands (it fulfills the ‘equal treatment of equals’ axiom characterizing 
symmetric rationing methods). While these advantages explain the 
popularity of this allocation procedure, it fails to achieve an economi-
cally efficient distribution of the available water. This is because irri-
gators are heterogeneous in terms of production potential (pedoclimatic 
conditions, production technology, or farm size − economies of scale) 
and the psychological characteristics (e.g., risk aversion) shaping their 
production decision-making (i.e., crop mixes), with both of these fea-
tures also determining heterogeneous agricultural and water produc-
tivity. Thus, proportional water rationing has quite different impacts on 
individual irrigators (e.g., intensive vs. extensive farmers), failing to 
minimize the aggregate losses stemming from water scarcity. There is a 
wide range of empirical evidence on this source of inefficiency in the 
irrigation sector (Alarcón et al., 2014; Martínez and Esteban, 2014; 
Goetz et al., 2017). 
Water rights regimes with different levels of priority are an inter-
esting alternative for the allocation of water within the agricultural 
sector during cyclical scarcity periods since they enable more efficient 
water use and risk-sharing (Freebairn and Quiggin, 2006; Lefebvre et al., 
2012). The key idea behind this allocation procedure is that the irriga-
tors who are more vulnerable to water supply gaps (e.g., farmers with 
perennial or horticultural crops) are able to reduce the risk related to 
water reliability by obtaining high-priority rights, transferring this risk 
to lower priority rights holders, who are better positioned to assume this 
risk (e.g., farmers with extensive annual crops). Also known as 
security-differentiated water rights, it is considered an adaptation 
measure to climate change (Xu et al., 2014; Mallawaarachchi et al., 
2020). Furthermore, this allocation rule enables higher priority rights 
holders to further specialize in higher value-added farming systems, 
thereby improving economic efficiency in the long-term (Xu et al., 
2014). Nevertheless, this rule is seldom implemented because the 
configuration of efficient portfolios of water rights involves significant 
transaction costs (Bjornlund, 2003b) and the fact that it is an asym-
metric rationing method (rights holders are treated differently) makes it 
politically and socially controversial. In any case, the literature provides 
consistent evidence that irrigators are willing to pay to increase water 
supply reliability (e.g., Rigby et al., 2010; Mesa-Jurado et al., 2012; 
Alcón et al., 2014; Guerrero-Baena et al., 2019), justifying their interest 
in obtaining higher priority rights. However, these irrigators’ capacity to 
cover the transactions costs and the compensation claimed by those 
keeping lower priority rights (i.e., ‘reliability losers’) is still an open 
question needing empirical research. 
Despite the abovementioned cons, priority allocation rules are in 
effect in the Western United States, following the ‘prior appropriation’ 
doctrine (i.e., priority determined by seniority), and in the Australian 
states of New South Wales, Queensland, Southern Australia, and Vic-
toria, based on two priority classes (e.g., ‘high security’ and ‘general 
security’ access entitlements in New South Wales, or ‘high reliability’ 
and ‘low reliability’ entitlements in Victoria) (Taylor, 2019). Both cases 
provide an interesting international experience to learn from in order to 
improve agricultural water management (Gómez-Limón et al., 2020). 
Within this framework, the objective of this paper is to assess the 
improvement in economic efficiency generated when an allocation 
regime based on the proportional rule is replaced with a regime based on 
a priority allocation rule. To that end, we focused on a Spanish irrigation 
district as a case study, using positive mathematical programming to 
simulate farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for higher priority water 
rights and willingness to accept (WTA) for lower priority rights, 
considering that their decisions regarding their individual portfolios of 
water rights determine their water supply reliability and farm profit-
ability in the long-run. This approach will allow us to assess economic 
efficiency gains (net social gains measured as the overall WTP minus 
overall WTA) linked to the implementation of the priority allocation 
rule. If this instrument were found to improve water-use efficiency, it 
would enable the design of win-win arrangements for all water rights 
holders, helping to overcome any political or social objection to this 
institutional change. 
The approach followed for this economic assessment contributes to 
the existing literature by modeling irrigators’ heterogeneity through a 
farm typology based on primary data collection and incorporating an 
updated distribution of the annual water allotments obtained from a 
stochastic hydrological simulation. These two features make the results 
obtained reliable enough to support policy decision-making aimed at 
improving irrigation water management at the irrigation district (ID) 
level. 
2. Agricultural water allocation in Spain: institutional 
framework 
2.1. Water allocation at the basin level 
The Spanish Water Act states that all water resources are in the 
public domain. The use of water for economic activities is permitted 
through administrative concessions or water rights that allow rights 
holders to extract water from a specific water body (river, aquifer, or 
reservoir) up to a maximum annual volume (full water allotment), with 
both of these elements established in the concession record. These rights 
are granted to private agents by the corresponding river basin authority 
(RBA). However, they do not guarantee the availability of the maximum 
water volume approved every year. The volume of water actually 
available for each rights holder (annual water allotment) is set every 
year depending on the hydrological situation (i.e., water stored in the 
reservoirs) and in accordance with the river basin management plan 
(RBMP). 
The Spanish mainland territory (i.e., excluding islands) is divided 
into 15 river basins, covering an area of 493,800 km2 and home to 46 
million people. The total water rights granted amount to 30,797 Mm3/ 
year (full water allotment), of which 5584 Mm3 goes to urban uses, 
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24,266 Mm3 to agriculture, and 948 Mm3 to other uses (industry, en-
ergy, etc.) (DGA and CEH, 2018). 
Most of the Spanish river basins have a Mediterranean climate, with 
an average annual precipitation of 667 mm, over 80% of which falls 
during the autumn and winter. This rainfall generates average water 
flows (water availability) of 99,684 Mm3/year. However, it is worth 
pointing out that most of the demand is concentrated during spring and 
summer for irrigation purposes. To match supply and demand in a 
timely manner, RBAs operate well-developed reservoir networks with a 
total storage capacity of 55,622 Mm3, which in ‘normal’ hydrological 
years (i.e., those when enough water is stored in reservoirs) allows all 
demands (both from water rights holders and 2984 Mm3/year to 
maintain the minimum ecological flows) to be fully met (DGA and CEH, 
2018). This is not the case in drought years when water rationing is 
needed to balance water availability and demands. 
In the case of cyclical scarcity, the RBAs limit water allocations ac-
cording to the RBMPs, applying a combination of two rationing rules. On 
the one hand, a priority rule is applied whereby rights holders are 
ranked by priority based on the use of water: urban uses are at the top of 
the list, having absolute priority over agricultural use (ranked as the 
second priority level) and all other economic activities (lowest priority 
level). The second rationing rule applies when the available water is not 
enough to meet all rights within the same priority level. In this case, a 
proportional distribution is applied to all these rights holders. In any 
case, since urban uses account only for 18.1% of the Spanish water 
rights, this demand is practically guaranteed, and is met even during the 
most extreme drought events. In fact, during prolonged droughts in 
Spain, water rationing using the proportional rule is only applied to 
agricultural water rights holders (78.8% of the water rights). 
Similarly to other countries such as Australia or the United States, 
Spain has used spot water markets since 1999 as a way to partially solve 
the problem of inefficient water allocation in the agricultural sector 
during cyclical scarcity periods due to proportional rationing. However, 
the performance of water markets in Spain has been rather disap-
pointing, since high transaction costs and multiple trade barriers limit 
trading activity (Palomo-Hierro et al., 2015). Moreover, it is expected 
that water trade instruments will be banned by the new left-wing 
Spanish government, on the grounds that “access to water is a human 
right and thus should not be considered a commercial asset”, as estab-
lished in the coalition government agreement signed by the two political 
parties supporting it. 
Given that we can reasonably anticipate an institutional context 
without water markets, the implementation of the priority rule is worth 
analyzing as an alternative allocation criterion for irrigation water, 
seeking to prevent the efficiency losses caused by the proportional rule 
during drought events (Gómez-Limón et al., 2020). However, allocation 
regimes at the national level are difficult and costly to adjust since they 
are path-dependent (institutional arrangements and long-lived water 
infrastructure). Nevertheless, as explained below, this is not the case at 
the ID level, where it is easier to change the institutional arrangements 
and the infrastructure. This justifies the scope of this paper, which is 
focused on changing allocation rules at the ID level. 
2.2. Water allocation at the irrigation district level: a proposal for reform 
Most irrigation water rights are collectively granted to all farmers 
operating within the same ID, organized into water users associations 
(WUAs). These WUAs are non-profit organizations that locally manage 
the water allotments annually set by the RBA, distributing the water 
available each year among their irrigators following their own allocation 
rules. Water management services provided by WUAs are financed by 
the recipient irrigators through annual payments set to ensure cost 
recovery. 
In almost all cases, WUAs have chosen the proportional rule as the 
internal allocation criterion to cope with water shortages. This paper 
proposes a shift away from proportional allocation towards a priority 
rule allowing the implementation of security-differentiated water rights 
at the ID level. It is worth clarifying that this change would only be 
implemented locally, simply by modifying water allocations among 
local farmers, while water allocations at the ID level would remain un-
changed (i.e., it is assumed that the RBA would continue to implement 
the proportional rule when allocating water among IDs). 
To effect this change in local allocation rules, following the Austra-
lian example, two priority classes are proposed, distinguishing between 
high-security or ‘priority’ rights and low-security or ‘general’ water 
rights. Irrigators would be able to combine these two priority rights 
creating a portfolio of water rights to achieve any desired level of reli-
ability, while minimizing the transaction costs involved in dynamically 
adapting to the optimal mix (Young and McColl, 2003). 
Under Spanish law, water rights can only be granted by the RBA. 
These water rights are granted for free to private agents based on general 
interest criteria, and these rights allow private agents to use water only 
for the specific purposes established by the RBA in the water entitlement 
(e.g., irrigation in a specific plot of land). This linkage between water 
rights and certain uses (i.e., water rights are bundled with land) is one of 
the principles of Spanish water law. There are two main reasons for this 
approach: first, to allow public authorities (RBAs) to allocate water re-
sources following general interest objectives that go beyond economic 
efficiency (e.g., territorial equity or environmental conservation); and 
second, to enable the public management of the already complex hy-
drological systems (mainly water storage and delivery) without drastic 
changes in the water uses (place and time for delivery). This explains 
why Spanish water law prohibits the exchange of water rights (perma-
nent or entitlements water markets). 
The proposed change in the allocation regime to introduce security- 
differentiated water rights at the ID level does not affect the above-
mentioned principle in any way. Taking the current situation as a 
starting point, we propose that at the beginning of the new allocation 
regime, water rights collectively granted to farmers within the same ID 
be shared out among all local irrigators on an area basis (i.e., 1 irrigated 
hectare = 1 water right), with all these rights initially considered as 
general rights. This change does not in itself entail any change in water 
allocations compared to the current implementation of the proportional 
rule. The real change is allowing a certain share of general water rights 
to be upgraded into priority rights. To carry out this upgrade process, an 
auction procedure is proposed. In these auctions, the bids offered by 
rights holders interested in upgrading would be measured as a surcharge 
on the annual payment to their WUA. Once this upgrade has been 
completed, the allocation regime will actually be changed to implement 
the priority rule. 
It is worth pointing out that in following the procedure described 
above, the principle of bundling water rights with the land is observed. 
In fact, when implementing the security-differentiated water rights as 
suggested, the irrigated area would remain unchanged (i.e., the total 
number of former water rights is equal to the sum of the new general and 
priority rights, and there is no exchange of rights, which is prohibited by 
Spanish law). Moreover, the water annually allocated to each ID would 
be exactly the same as before (i.e., available water at the basin level for 
irrigation is shared among IDs according to the current proportional rule 
set by law); thus, public management of water resources at the basin 
level (water storage and delivery) could be carried out as it is currently 
done. This proposal is therefore different to the Australian case, where 
the conversion of rights has been set at defined rates; specifically, 
existing general rights can be upgraded to priority security via a con-
version factor (e.g., 3 general rights = 1 priority security) and a trans-
formation price, drastically altering the management of the hydrological 
systems. 
The change proposed would involve gains for those rights holders 
upgrading a share of their rights (more reliable water supply). However, 
this change also involves a loss for those rights holders that do not up-
grade their rights, since their water supply based only on general water 
rights becomes less reliable. This loss is the reason why they should be 
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compensated for this change in the allocation regime. For this purpose, 
the total amount of money collected through these surcharges would be 
used to reduce the annual payments of all general rights holders to the 
WUA (increased income from surcharges on priority rights would allow 
the payments for general rights to be reduced while the services pro-
vided by the WUA remain self-financed). 
Under the proposal simulated here, those who win the bid in the 
auction can hold priority rights forever, enabling long-term investment 
planning (e.g., fruit orchards or irrigation technology). In any case, our 
proposal also assumes that there would be a local water rights market 
allowing the dynamic allocation of these priority rights. 
This proposal for implementing a priority rule would have to be 
accepted by a majority of irrigators (i.e., approved as an allocation rule 
within the WUA) if this change is to create a win-win solution, where 
both ‘reliability winners’ (those upgrading their rights into priority 
ones) and ‘reliability losers’ (those keeping their general rights) increase 
their profitability. In other words, for the proposed change to be suc-
cessful, the increase in farm profitability achieved by ‘reliability win-
ners’ must be higher than the surcharges they would have to pay, and 
the reduction in the annual payments to the WUA charged to ‘reliability 
losers’ must outweigh their farm profitability losses. This condition 
would be met only if the change in allocation rule leads to an increase in 
economic efficiency, that is, if the aggregate profitability at the ID level 
increases. 
The main objective of this paper is to empirically test whether the 
proposed change in the allocation rules can enhance economic efficiency 
in the case study considered. For this purpose, a simulation exercise is 
performed, with the programming model also providing information 
about the optimum percentage of rights to be upgraded into priority 
rights (i.e., the share that maximizes economic efficiency at the ID level). 
3. Case study 
3.1. The Sector BXII irrigation district 
The Sector BXII (SBXII) is an ID covering 14,643 ha close to the 
mouth of the Guadalquivir River. This district is operated by 569 farmers 
(average farm size of 25.7 ha) organized into a WUA holding a collective 
water right of 6000 cubic meters per hectare and year (full water 
allotment). The WUA is in charge of water allocation among all irriga-
tors, currently doing so according to the proportional rule. The costs of 
the water management services provided are financed through a bino-
mial tariff, with each irrigator annually paying 294 euros per hectare to 
recover fixed operational and management costs, plus a volumetric 
charge of 0.003 euros per cubic meter of water applied to recover energy 
(pumping) costs. 
Although this area was converted to irrigation during the 1980s, the 
irrigation infrastructure and techniques have since been updated. 
Sprinkler irrigation predominates (72%), although drip (22%) and sur-
face irrigation (6%) are also used depending on the crop. This modern 
technology and the good agronomic conditions of the district make it a 
valuable example of highly profitable irrigation production, where 
water-use efficiency is relatively high. However, the main problem faced 
by irrigators in the SBXII is their sensitivity to water supply gaps (i.e., 
water shortages during drought periods). When the availability of irri-
gation water is not enough to meet full water allocations, they experi-
ence fairly large losses, much higher than those registered by other, less 
modernized and less efficient irrigators elsewhere in the basin. 
The main crops in the area are cotton (44.5%), corn (12.9%), tomato 
(11.5%), sugar beet (9.4%), wheat (8.7%), sunflower (6.7%), and other 
vegetables such as carrots and onions (6.3%). However, it is worth 
mentioning that there are several productive profiles at the farm level. In 
order to characterize them, a random sample of 59 farms located in the 
SBXII was selected, gathering data regarding their main productive 
features (size, crop mixes, productive technologies, and income and 
costs by crops) and the socio-demographic characteristics of their 
farmers (age, educational level, etc.). A typology of the farms sampled 
was identified through cluster analysis, using the percentage of the area 
devoted to each crop as differentiating variables (for further details, see 
Montilla-López et al., 2018). The characteristics of each identified farm 
type are summarized as follows:  
• Farm type 1 (FT1): Large professional farmers. This type represents 
39% of farms in the sample, and accounts for 52% of the total irri-
gable area. This is the largest farm type in the SBXII (35.8 ha), mainly 
oriented towards horticultural crops (tomato, 30.3%; carrot, 5.3%; 
and onion, 1.6%), which are the most profitable crops. Other 
important crops are cotton (29.6%) and sugar beet (24.0%).  
• Farm type 2 (FT2): Risk diversifiers. This farm type represents 41% of 
the farmers in the sample and accounts for 36% of the area of the 
SBXII. It is a medium-sized farm (23.9 ha), characterized by having a 
highly diversified crop plan, and dedicating areas to most of the 
existing crop options in the study area.  
• Farm type 3 (FT3): Extensive conservative farmers. This type of farm 
represents the smallest proportion of farmers in the sample (20%), 
covering just 11% of the total area of the SBXII. It is therefore the 
smallest farm type, with an average of 15.0 ha. Its agricultural area is 
cultivated with the most extensive crops such as cotton (57.0%), and 
sugar beet (39.1%), which are both highly dependent on coupled 
subsidies. 
As shown in Table 1, these farm types are heterogeneous in terms of 
the profitability and productivity of water. This means that they differ 
notably in the losses caused by proportional rationing implemented 
during drought events, with much greater losses occurring in the case of 
the most intensive farming (FT1, specialized in vegetables, with higher 
productivity of water) and more moderate losses for extensive farming 
(FT2 and FT3, focused on industrial crops and cereals, with lower pro-
ductivity of water). This heterogeneity justifies the choice of this case 
study to explore the implementation of priority water rights as an in-
strument to improve water management during scarcity periods. 
3.2. Annual water allotments in the SBXII irrigation district 
The SBXII is located in a Mediterranean region where irrigated 
agriculture is particularly vulnerable to the risk of hydrological drought, 
meaning annual water allotments are frequently lower than those fixed 
in the water rights (full water allotments). Thus, annual water allotment 
must be considered as a stochastic variable that needs to be character-
ized before modeling the potential impact of any change in the 
Table 1 
Characteristic variables of farm types in the SBXII.   
FT1. Large profe- 
ssional farmers 
FT2. Risk diversi- 
fying farmers 
FT3. Extensive con- 
servative farmers 
Farm size (ha)  35.8  23.9  15.0 
Cotton (ha)  11.6  14.8  8.6 
Corn (ha)  0.0  2.4  0.0 
Tomato (ha)  11.9  3.3  0.0 
Sugar beet (ha)  9.4  1.6  5.9 
Wheat (ha)  0.0  1.7  0.6 
Other vegetables 
(ha)  
2.7  0.0  0.0 
Total income (€/ha)  5433  3877  3175 
Total variable costs 
(€/ha)  
2412  1840  1396 
Total gross margin 
(€/ha)  




0.541  0.432  0.335 
Note: Crop mix under full water allotments. 
Source: Gómez-Limón (2020) based on data gathered by Montilla-López et al. 
(2018). 
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allocation rules. 
The distribution of the annual water allotments to the SBXII (w̃aid) 
could be fitted to different probability distribution functions according 
to historical records (e.g., Rey et al., 2016). However, this approach is 
not suitable when the water system analyzed has substantially changed 
over recent years, as is the case in the Guadalquivir River Basin, where 
the SBXII is located. Given recent changes in water demands (new water 
rights granted), reservoir infrastructure (increased storage capacity), 
and water management rules (larger minimum ecological flows) 
(Expósito and Berbel, 2019), distributions fitted according to past re-
cords are not appropriate for assessing feasible hydrological situations 
and current water supply reliability. Therefore, an approach based on a 
stochastic hydrological simulation model considering the new demand 
and supply constraints and the institutional framework fixed in the 
Guadalquivir RBMP (CHG, 2015) is needed to estimate the probability 
distributions of annual water allotments. This approach has been 
implemented by Gómez-Limón (2020) for the hydrological system 
where the case study area is located (Sistema de Regulación General), 
yielding the empirical histogram shown in Fig. 1. 
The shape of this histogram does not fit to any commonly-used dis-
tribution function. For this reason, we directly rely on the simulated 
observations obtained by Gómez-Limón (2020) as irrigation water 
allotment scenarios to feed the mathematical programming model built 
(see next section). 
4. Modeling approach 
A positive mathematical programming model is built to simulate 
farmers’ behavior under the new water rights regime proposed, in order 
to compare its potential performance with the current proportional 
allocation rule, in terms of economic efficiency. In the simulation of both 
allocation regimes, water trading is not allowed (i.e., anticipating an 
institutional context in Spain without water markets), meaning the 
analysis is focused on allocation rules as instruments for enhancing 
water efficiency. 
4.1. Proportional and priority allocation rules 
The ID (subscript id) taken as a case study comprises the three farm 
types (subscript f) which are considered as the decision-making units. 
Each farm type represents nf farms with an average size of sf irrigated 
hectares, with their weights being wf =
nf ⋅sf
sid , and where sid is the area of 
the ID (sid =
∑
f nf ⋅sf ). 
Under current internal management rules, annual water allotments 
granted to the ID (WAid measured in cubic meters) are shared propor-
tionally among all farm types, i.e. water allocations in cubic meters per 
hectare (waf ) are the same for all farm types within the ID, such that 
waf = waid = WAid/sid for every f . Consequently, the water allocation 
for farm type f measured in cubic meters is WAf = waf ⋅sf . 
Under the proposed new distribution rules, the ID would hold water 
rights defined as a portfolio of two different water rights, priority and 
general rights, which would be distributed among farms in any pro-
portion. Therefore, each farm type would hold a different portfolio of 
water rights. The share of priority rights per farm type is denoted as PRf , 
while the share of general rights is denoted as GRf , with the two shares 
adding up to one (PRf + GRf = 1). Initially, the optimal share of priority 
rights at the ID level (PRid =
∑
f PRf ⋅wf ) is unknown, so it will be 
parametrized to determine the PRid that yields the best outcome. 
Under this new water rights regime, the annual water allotments to 
be allocated to each farm type are defined as the sum of the allotments 
granted for priority rights (wapr) and for general rights (wagr): 
waf = wapr⋅PRf +wagr⋅GRf (1) 
These two terms are both determined annually depending on the 
water allocated to the ID () following the abovementioned priority 
procedure. Thus, priority rights are served first with the full water 
allotment granted to the ID (fwaid) as long as the water availability waid 
is enough to cover all water demands from priority rights holders. After 
that, the remaining water is allocated proportionally among general 
rights holders (see Eq. (2)). In the event that there is not enough water to 
meet full allocations for priority rights, the available water is to be ra-
tioned among priority rights holders following the proportional rule. In 
this case, general rights holders would not receive any water allocation 
(see Eq. (3)). 






wapr = f waid
wagr =












We assume that farmers try to maximize farming profits as a function 




). As explained above, irrigators’ 
evitaleR
ycneuqerf
Annual water allotment ( ) / Annual full allotment ( )
Fig. 1. Distribution of the annual water allotments (w̃aid) for the SBXII. 
Source: Gómez-Limón (2020). 
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annual water allotments are variable depending on the water avail-
ability at the ID level. Thus, since water allotments are stochastic vari-
ables (both w̃aid and w̃af ), farming profits are also stochastic variables 
(π̃f ). To simulate the risk from water supply variability at the ID and 
farm levels, N = 5000 probabilistic values for w̃aid drawn from the 
hydrological simulation model built by Gómez-Limón (2020) have 
been considered, thus defining 5000 equally probable scenarios 
(n = 1, …,5000). 
4.2. Farmers’ decision making for a given water allotment scenario 
For operative purposes, we take the expected total gross margin 
(i.e., total income minus variable costs, GMf ) as a proxy for farming 
profits in the short-run, defined as a mathematical function of farmers’ 
decision variables, that is, the area covered by the different crops. In our 
case study, these variables are denoted by Xc,f , where c denotes the crop 
and f indicates the farm type. In addition, farmers can make decisions 
regarding the share of their water right to be upgraded into priority 
rights (PRf ), with the remaining water rights being considered as general 
water rights (GRf ). Thus, farmers’ decision-making is simulated by 
maximizing the expected total gross margin considering both kinds of 





Following mainstream mathematical programming techniques used 
for ex-ante policy analysis, our modeling approach is based on Positive 
Mathematical Programming (PMP) (Heckelei et al., 2012). We imple-
mented the standard approach formally introduced by Howitt (1995) for 
two reasons. First, it is a simple method to apply in that it does not 
require exogenous information, facilitating its application to other case 
studies elsewhere. Second, this method allows us to overcome one of the 
problems of the PMP: namely, the impossibility of calibrating activities 
not observed in the reference year, which is a necessity in our case in 
order to add rainfed crops as alternatives in the event of irrigation water 
supply gaps. Using Howitt’s standard method prevents us from cali-
brating the activities not observed in the reference year, with these crops 
being added using their average cost (instead of the usual PMP quadratic 
cost functions). This approach is suitable because rainfed crops are much 
less profitable than irrigated crops, so these alternatives only appear in 
cases when the annual water allotments are much lower than full water 
allotments and farmers are compelled to reduce the farming area actu-
ally irrigated. 
This standard PMP procedure calibrates a non-linear objective 
function for profit based on the observed behavior of farmers (i.e., 
observed crop mix under a full water allotment scenario) to exactly 
reproduce activity levels. Among the alternative options for eliciting the 
calibrating parameters, we use the average cost approach (Heckelei and 
Britz, 2000), assuming a quadratic variable cost function for every crop c 
(cvc = αc⋅Xc + ½⋅βc⋅X2c ), where αc and βc are parameters to be elicited in 
order to reproduce the exact activity levels for each farm type in the 









αc,f ⋅Xc,f +½⋅βc,f ⋅X2c,f (4) 
Although there are multiple sets of cost function parameters αc,f and 
βc,f that can exactly reproduce observed behavior, under the average 
cost approach the quadratic cost function equals the accounting cost of 
the crop, resulting in the following calibrating parameter definitions: 





where avcc,f is the average or observed accounting variable cost of crop c 
in farm type f , Xobsc,f is the observed area of crop c in a year with full water 
allotment (waid = fwaid) in farm type f , and μc,f are the dual values of the 
calibration constraints reproducing a ‘normal’ hydrological scenario 
(i.e., where no water rationing is needed). A review of the standard PMP 
and the average cost approach can be found in Heckelei and Britz 
(2005). 
The PMP calibrated model can then be used for simulating farmers’ 
decision-making in other scenarios (e.g., water shortage situations and 
under different water allocation rules) by modifying the objective 
function, changing the values of the non-calibrating parameters, adding 
new constraints (e.g., water availability), or adding new decision vari-
ables (e.g., new crop alternatives) accordingly. One of the most valuable 
advantages of the PMP is that it provides more flexible and realistic 
simulation responses than normative mathematical programming 
models (Henry de Frahan et al., 2007). 
It is assumed that when faced with water shortages (i.e., 
waid < fwaid), farmers react by changing their crop mixes, replacing 
crops that have higher water requirements with others that have lower 
water needs or even rainfed crops (i.e., null irrigation water require-
ment). Thus, in addition to the observed irrigated crops, two rainfed 
alternatives (wheat and sunflower) have also been considered as deci-
sion variables for simulating decision-making under drought scenarios. 
Other potential management strategies to cope with cyclical scarcity 
(e.g., improving irrigation efficiency at farm level or implementing 
deficit irrigation) have been ruled out since they are not suitable for IDs 
with modern irrigation technologies (i.e., they have already achieved 
efficient water use) specialized in herbaceous crops (i.e., deficit irriga-
tion doses do not lead to more profitability). 
Considering the priority allocation rule proposed, farm types’ 
decision-making can be integrated into a single model at the ID level 
where optimum values for variables Xc,f and PRf (and GRf ) are to be 

















∀f (7.2)  
∑
c
Xc,f = sf ∀f (7.3)  
∑
c
wrc⋅Xc,f ≤ waf ⋅sf ∀f (7.4)  





fwaid, waid ≥ PRid⋅fwaid
waid
PRid








, waid ≥ PRid⋅fwaid
0, waid < PRid⋅fwaid
(7.7)  
PRf + GRf = 1 ∀f (7.8)  
∑
f
PRf ⋅wf = PRid (7.9)  
Af Xf ≤ Bf ∀f (7.10)  
Xc,f ≥ 0; PRf ≥ 0; GRf ≥ 0 ∀c, f (7.11)  
where GMf represents the farm gross margin, calculated as the sum of 
total income, including both product sales (crop price, pc, multiplied by 
crop yield, yc) and coupled subsidies (sc), minus the variable cost 
function (αc,f + ½⋅βc,f ⋅Xc,f ) for every crop c. Constraints (7.3) is related to 
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land availability and limits the total area covered by the different crop 
alternatives to the farm size (sf ). Eqs. (7.4)–(7.9) are related to water 
availability. The water constraints Eq. (7.4) establishes that irrigation 
water use cannot exceed water availability, with the former being the 
sum of water requirements per crop (wrc) and the latter the water 
allocation per farm type (waf ⋅sf ). waf is defined in (7.5) as a portfolio of 
water allocated to priority rights (wapr) and general rights (wagr) as 
defined by Eqs. (7.6) and (7.7), derived from Eqs. (2) and (3) explained 
above. Eq. (7.8) simply states that water rights granted to each farm type 
are composed of a portfolio of priority and general rights. Constraint 
(7.9) just limits the maximum share of rights that can be upgraded to 
priority rights at the ID level, as fixed by the parameter PRid. Eq. (7.10) 
denotes the rest of the constraints defining the feasible solution set, 
which constitute agronomic (rotational and frequency requirements), 
policy (cotton and sugar-beet quotas), and market requirements, with Xf 
being the matrix containing all variables Xc,f , Af the technical coefficient 
matrix for every variable and constraint of the farm type f , and Bf the 
vector of limit values for each constraint for the farm type f . Finally, 
non-negativity constraints are imposed for Xc,f , PRf and GRf (Eq. (7.11)). 
Considering the current proportional allocation rule, farm types’ 
decision-making can also be integrated with a simplified version of 
model (7), skipping Eqs. (7.6)–(7.9) and replacing Eq. (7.5) by waf =
waid for every farm type f . 
4.3. Farmers’ decision-making considering the full distribution of water 
allotments 
It should be recalled that the annual water allotment granted to the 
ID is a stochastic variable (w̃aid) ranging from fwaid to 0. Within this 
stochastic framework, it is assumed that farmers make decisions 
regarding the upgrade of water rights in an attempt to maximize their 
expected (or average) total gross margin. Thus, considering N = 5000 



















∀f , n (8.2)  
∑
c
Xc,f ,n = sf ∀f , n (8.3)  
∑
c
wrc⋅Xc,f ,n ≤ waf ,n⋅sf ∀f , n (8.4)  





fwaid, waid,n ≥ PRid⋅fwaid
waid,n
PRid








, waid,n ≥ PRid⋅fwaid
0, waid,n < PRid⋅fwaid
(8.7)  
PRf + GRf = 1 ∀f , n (8.8)  
∑
f
PRf ⋅wf = PRid ∀n (8.9)  
Af Xf ,n ≤ Bf ∀f , n (8.10)  
Xc,f ,n ≥ 0; PRid ≥ 0; PRf ≥ 0; GRf ≥ 0 ∀c, f , n (8.11) 
This probabilistic approach involves N values for waf ,n, also affecting 
in each scenario n crop mixes (Xc,f ,n), and thus GMf ,n. The objective 
function in this model (8.1) allows the joint maximization of the average 
gross margin for all farm types, as a result of the optimum decision- 
making regarding the upgrade into priority rights. It is also worth 
recalling that PRid is parametrized, so we can find the optimal share of 
priority rights within the ID that maximizes the total efficiency. 
To evaluate the possible improvements under this new water allo-
cation regime in terms of economic efficiency, it is necessary to establish 
a baseline scenario. To do this, the stochastic model is also solved 
considering current proportional allocation rules (i.e., without the pos-
sibility of acquiring priority rights). Thus, model (8) is also solved by 
ignoring Eqs. (8.6)–(8.9) and substituting Eq. (8.5) with waf ,n = waid,n 
for every farm type f . In doing so, we are able to obtain any variations in 
gross margins and water use at the farm and ID level, as well as other 
indicators for the analysis, allowing an assessment of the proposed 
allocation rule. 
5. Results 
The results of the simulation model yield evidence that priority rights 
could enhance overall economic efficiency. In fact, compared to the 
baseline values of the current proportional water rights regime, the 
average gross margin at the ID level is increased for every possible value 
of the parameter PRid (share of priority rights over total water rights). 
However, these improvements in economic efficiency are almost negli-
gible, registering a disappointing maximum of 0.2% of the current gross 
margins for the optimum value for PRid (20.5%). 
As can be observed in Fig. 2, the increase in the average gross margin 
at the ID level (black line) is the overall result of heterogeneous impacts 
on the different farm types considered (gray lines). FT1 shows a signif-
icant WTP for upgrading general water rights into priority ones, since 
this upgrade allows the highest increase in average profitability, 
reaching a maximum WTP of 2.1% of its current gross margin (i.e., with 
proportional water rights). Conversely, FT2 and FT3 register the lowest 
WTA for reducing their water supply reliability as a consequence of 
keeping general water rights, requiring compensation (i.e., reduction on 
the annual payment to the WAU) ranging from 0% to 5.1% of their 
current gross margins depending on the total share of priority rights 
granted. 
In any case, it should be highlighted that, theoretically, the WTA of 
FT2 and FT3 could be fully met by the WTP of FT1 through the proposed 
compensation instrument, while still leaving a gross margin surplus (i.e., 
economic efficiency increase). Nevertheless, it is also worth mentioning 
that the modeling approach followed has been simplified by assuming 
null transaction costs, both static and institutional transaction costs 
(Garrick et al., 2013; Marshall, 2013). Thus, since the WTP-WTA gap is 
very small in this case study (a surplus of only 0.2% of current gross 
margins), it is reasonable to assume that in a real-world setting there 
would actually be no room for any efficiency increase. 
Table 2 shows the simulation results for the maximum efficiency 
solution, based on a 20.5% share of priority water rights granted at the 
ID level. Taking this solution as the best possible outcome, it can be 
observed that FT1 upgrades 30.7% of its water rights into priority ones. 
However, it is worth noting that FT2 and FT3 also upgrade a share of 
their water rights, although in lower proportions (11.3% and 3.1%, 
respectively). This optimum allocation of priority water rights allows 
FT1 to increase its average annual water allocation compared to the 
current situation (i.e., implementation of proportional water rights), 
while its water allocation became more stable over time (an increase of 
3.2% in the average allocation and a decrease of 11.3% in its standard 
deviation). Accordingly, this improved water supply reliability leads to 
an increase in the average gross margin (2.0%) and a decrease in its 
volatility (18.0% decrease in its standard deviation), prompting this 
farm type to make the highest bid for a rights upgrade (i.e., annual 
surcharges to be paid) through the auction procedure suggested. 
On the other hand, the irrigation water supply gets worse for FT2 and 
FT3, both in terms of the average (decreases of 2.9% and 5.5%, 
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respectively) and the volatility (increases of 10.3% and 19.5%, respec-
tively, in their standard deviations). This deteriorated supply reliability 
leads to worse profitability indicators: reduced average gross margins 
(2.1% and 5.0%, respectively) and increased profit volatility (22.1% 
increase in the standard deviation of the gross margin for both farm 
types). Nevertheless, these farming losses could theoretically be fully 
compensated by the surcharges paid by FT1. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that the overall volume of water 
allocated at the ID level is the same as in the proportional water rights 
baseline. This constraint was implicitly assumed in the proposal, in 
order to ensure that the proposed change in the water allocation regime 
has no direct impact on the environment (e.g., water abstractions). 
However, the implementation of security-differentiated water rights 
could involve some spillover effects, both positive and negative, on the 
environment. First, it could be logically assumed that the priority system 
may lessen the incentive to steal water for those more efficient farmers 
who are more sensitive to water supply gaps (Loch et al., 2020b). Sec-
ond, the reform proposed in the water allocation regime could produce a 
negative side effect on the environment by decreasing the return flows. 
Indeed, the farmers who are most willing to acquire priority rights are 
usually those who are more efficient in water use because they use more 
modern irrigation techniques. Thus, it could be expected that the more 
priority rights these farmers acquire, the lower the return flows to wa-
tercourses, negatively affecting environmental flows. At any rate, in the 
case study considered, the effects on returns would not have a significant 
impact on the environment because this ID is located close to the mouth 
of the Guadalquivir River, and almost all the returns from the ID go 
directly to the sea. Nevertheless, because of how difficult they are to 
assess, none of these potential side effects has been considered in the 
modeling exercise implemented. 
Lastly, the results obtained for specific water allotment scenarios 
(waid) under the optimum priority rights sharing, as shown in Table 3, 
are also noteworthy. It can be easily seen that, compared to the pro-
portional rights regime, the implementation of priority rights increases 
water allotments and annual gross margins in the case of FT1 (the 
‘reliability winner’), while FT2 and FT3 (‘reliability losers’) show a 
decrease in these two variables. However, the most notable result is that 
the overall variation in gross margins at the ID level is not always pos-
itive. For moderate to severe drought scenarios, with an annual ID-level 
water allocation of between 3723 and 2032 m3/ha, the outcome of the 
implementation of the proposed priority regime is worse than that of the 
current proportional water rights. Thus, the implementation of priority 
rights not only provides a tiny increase in average economic efficiency 
but also involves annual economic inefficiency for a range of drought 
scenarios with a probability of occurrence of 14.9%. However, it is also 
true that priority rights could yield an efficiency increase in the event of 
an extreme drought (annual water allotment below 1300 m3/ha). 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In light of the results obtained, we reject the initial hypothesis that 





























Share of priority rights at the irriga�on district level ( ) (%)
FT1 FT2 FT3 ID
Fig. 2. Maximum efficiency solutions parametrizing the share of priority rights at the ID level (PRid): average gross margin by farm type.  
Table 2 
Maximum efficiency solution: Share of priority water rights, gross margin, and water use by farm type.   
FT1 FT2 FT3 ID 
Priority water rights (%)  30.7%  11.3%  3.1%  20.5% 
Average annual water allocation (m3/ha) Proportional rule  4753.2  4753.2  4753.2  4753.2 
Priority rule  4906.1  4615.7  4492.8  4753.2 
Increase (Priority-Prop.)  152.9 (3.2%)  -137.5 (− 2.9%)  -260.4 (− 5.5%)  0.0 (0.0%) 
Std. deviation annual water allocation (m3/ha) Proportional rule  1454.6  1454.6  1454.6  1454.6 
Priority rule  1290.0  1604.2  1738.9  1454.6 
Increase (Priority-Prop.)  -164.6 (− 11.3%)  149.6 (10.3%)  284.3 (19.5%)  0.0 (0.0%) 
Average annual gross margin (€/ha) Proportional rule  2640.1  1990.8  1586.5  2283.5 
Priority rule  2693.2  1949.3  1507.7  2287.1 
Increase (Priority-Prop.)  53.2 (2.0%)  -41.5 (− 2.1%)  -78.8 (− 5.0%)  3.6 (0.2%) 
Std. deviation annual gross margin (€/ha) Proportional rule  429.9  315.4  334.2  375.8 
Priority rule  352.6  385.3  445.6  372.4 
Increase (Priority-Prop.)  -77.3 (− 18.0%)  69.8 (22.1%)  111.4 (22.1%)  -3.4 (− 0.9%) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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priority rule establishing security-differentiated water rights can help 
improve water-use efficiency in the agricultural sector at the local (i.e., 
irrigation district) level. In fact, although the simulated performance 
shows that this reform in irrigation water rights could generate a slight 
efficiency improvement, the economic gains would not be enough to 
cover the transaction costs associated with the implementation of the 
proposed allocation regime (an upgrade of water rights through auctions 
and a compensation procedure to indemnify “reliability losers”). 
These disappointing results are explained by the fact that priority 
rights do not reflect the marginal value of water across users in a timely 
manner (OECD, 2016). If the main political objective is to improve 
economic efficiency, the most suitable instrument would be the spot 
water market (allocation trading), as it is the most useful mechanism for 
equalizing the marginal benefit of water across users (Chong and 
Sunding, 2006). Water scarcity is a dynamic phenomenon that must be 
managed through the implementation of sufficiently flexible in-
struments capable of modifying allocations in the short term, just as the 
spot water markets do. This is not the case of allocation regimes based on 
priority rights, which is a rigid instrument that cannot be modulated 
depending on the level of water scarcity. In fact, as shown by the 
Australian experience, priority rights should not be considered as an 
alternative instrument to spot water markets, but rather a complemen-
tary instrument to water trading that can help improve water-use 
efficiency. 
As far as the authors know, the assessment performed in this paper is 
innovative. However, a few previous related studies analyzing other 
water rationing rules are worth citing. In this sense, Martínez and 
Esteban (2014), Alarcón et al. (2014), and Goetz et al. (2017) have 
focused on other allocation rules (uniform, sequential, equal economic 
loss, or minimization of the total accumulated loss rules) proposed by 
economic theory, also using mathematical programming simulation 
techniques. These authors report that while these alternative allocation 
rules could provide significant efficiency improvements at the ID level 
compared to the proportional rule currently implemented, all of them 
are outperformed by spot water markets. Although all this evidence is 
useful for policy analysis, it is also true that the implementation of these 
alternative allocation rules could be complex in a real-world setting (e. 
g., economic analyses of the heterogeneity of farmers’ losses due to 
water shortages would first be needed), involving significant transaction 
costs. This is one of the reasons why they have not yet been implemented 
anywhere. 
Another related contribution worth noting is the study by Adamson 
et al. (2006). These authors also assess a water allocation regime with 
two security-differentiated water rights (high and low priority), which is 
compared with the proportional allocation rule. For this purpose, they 
use a state-contingent model of production under uncertainty with three 
states of nature (normal, drought, and wet), which is applied to the 
Murray-Darling Basin, including all water rights holders (both urban 
and agricultural). They conclude that a water allocation solution with 
two levels of priority rights outperforms that obtained using the 
proportional rule. 
There may be several reasons behind the unexpected and contra-
dictory results reported in this paper. First, the differences found could 
be largely explained by the different scopes of the changes proposed in 
water allocation rules. While in this paper the assessment performed 
considers a change in allocation rules at the ID level only (water allo-
cation among farmers within the same ID), other studies have consid-
ered a shift in allocation rules for all water rights holders in a river basin, 
thus also affecting water allocation among IDs. In this respect, it would 
seem logical to assume that by including more heterogeneity among 
water rights holders, priority rights could yield higher water-use effi-
ciency improvements. In any case, further research would be necessary 
to confirm that greater heterogeneity would lead to priority allocation 
solutions clearly outperforming those obtained with the proportional 
rule, as evidenced in the case of the Murray-Darling Basin (Adamson 
et al., 2006). 
Second, the SBXII ID is a particular case study that is notable for its 
specialization in annual crops (no perennial crop is grown in this dis-
trict). This characteristic probably also limits the efficiency gains re-
ported here since farms with perennial crops are among those that stand 
to benefit the most from priority rights (most permanent crops cannot be 
grown under rainfed conditions in case of irrigation water supply gaps, 
requiring priority rights to ensure a sufficiently reliable supply). In this 
regard, it is also worth acknowledging the limitation of the modeling 
approach proposed to properly account for investment in fixed assets (e. 
g., perennial crops or production technologies). Thus, the results re-
ported do account for potential further specialization in higher profit-
ability farming systems, also helping to improve water-use efficiency in 
the long-term, as has been evidenced in the United States or Australia 
(Xu et al., 2014). 
Third, it worth noting that the results reported also reflect the cur-
rent probability distribution of annual water allotments (see Fig. 1). 
Although annual water allotments are fairly often lower than the full 
water allotment, the well-developed network of reservoirs in the Gua-
dalquivir Basin (i.e., interannual storage capacity) means that there is 
currently a fairly low risk of severe irrigation water supply gaps (e.g., 
annual water allotments lower than 30% of full water allotment). As a 
result, the efficiency gains from priority rights are lower than those 
expected in basins with a higher probability of extreme hydrological 
droughts. However, this could be the situation in the Guadalquivir Basin 
in the near future, as climate change projections point to an increase in 
the frequency and intensity of droughts events. 
Fourth, the results obtained could also be influenced by the case- 
specific agricultural policy framework (i.e., coupled subsidies and pro-
duction quotas, which may not exist in other regions), which compli-
cates comparisons with other irrigated agricultural systems. In fact, it is 
worth pointing out that the application of the proposed simulation 
approach to other irrigated areas would require some fine-tuning to 
reflect local policy conditions. 
In any case, allocation regimes based on priority rights are 
Table 3 
Maximum efficiency solution: Increase in gross margin by irrigation water allotment scenario and farm type.  
waid (m3/ha)  Increase in annual gross margin (Priority-Prop.) (€/ha and percentage) GM increase ID (1000 €) 
FT1 FT2 FT3 ID 
6000  0.0 (0.0%)  0.0 (0.0%)  0.0 (0.0%)  0.0 (0.0%)  0.0 
5400  3.8 (0.1%)  0.0 (0.0%)  -0.2 (0.0%)  1.9 (0.1%)  28.4 
4800  34.1 (1.2%)  -1.1 (− 0.1%)  -58.2 (− 3.4%)  10.8 (0.4%)  157.9 
4200  56.1 (2.1%)  -28.9 (− 1.4%)  -92.8 (− 5.9%)  8.1 (0.4%)  119.4 
3600  89.2 (3.6%)  -92.2 (− 4.6%)  -144.5 (− 10.1%)  -3.5 (− 0.2%)  -51.4 
3000  133.9 (5.9%)  -137.0 (− 7.7%)  -208.9 (− 16.5%)  -3.9 (− 0.2%)  -56.4 
2400  182.4 (9.0%)  -174.3 (− 11.3%)  -288.7 (− 26.9%)  -1.2 (− 0.1%)  -17.5 
1800  238.7 (13.5%)  -218.3 (− 17.0%)  -373.2 (− 43.5%)  2.5 (0.2%)  37.2 
1200  340.3 (23.9%)  -276.9 (− 27.3%)  -455.0 (− 73.4%)  24.8 (2.1%)  363.7 
600  302.4 (34.7%)  -210.1 (− 30.0%)  -240.7 (− 66.7%)  53.8 (7.2%)  788.5 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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interesting for two reasons. First, as pointed out by Freebairn and 
Quiggin (2006) and Lefebvre et al. (2012), these allocation regimes 
could be successfully combined with spot water markets, as in the 
Australian experience, where the joint implementation of these two 
instruments has led to significant improvements in drought manage-
ment in the irrigation sector. Second, priority rights are an interesting 
risk management instrument for farmers. As shown in the simulation 
results, the farmers who are most vulnerable to risk (FT1 in our case 
study) can use priority rights as a hedging mechanism, reducing gross 
margin volatility. In the context of climate change, where farmers are 
eager to stabilize their income, these priority rights constitute an 
important adaptation instrument. 
Finally, further research is called for to refine the proposed modeling 
approach and thereby obtain more accurate results. In this sense, more 
detailed modeling of decision-making regarding the upgrade of water 
rights could be achieved by accounting for possible changes in produc-
tion technologies (investments in irrigation systems or perennial crops), 
the existence of transaction costs, and heterogeneity in farmers’ risk 
preferences. Moreover, assessing the impact of priority rights at the 
basin level, incorporating more farm type heterogeneity, could provide 
relevant new insights into this topic. These new avenues for research 
pose challenges, since uncertainty about the future state of water sys-
tems creates difficulties in simulating farmers’ strategic decision-making 
(i.e., decisions involving investments in fixed capital), and assessing the 
multiple impacts of investments made chasing higher economic returns 
(e.g., Loch et al., 2020a suggest potentially irreversible losses of capital 
tied to water inputs and changing incentives to steal water resources). 
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CHG (Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadalquivir), 2015. Plan Hidrológico de la 
Demarcación del Guadalquivir (2015–2021). Confederación Hidrográfica del 
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